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a Response to Julie de Coninck
By Ralf Michaels, Durham, N. C.
Contents
 I. Introduction  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  351
 II. Explanation .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  352
 III. Functions  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  355
 IV. Interpretation.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  356
 V. Conclusion.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  358
I. Introduction
I am excited about Julie de Coninck’s project as described in the article in 
this journal,1 and expanded in another one, published elsewhere,2 and grate-
ful to the journal’s editors to invite my brief response. I share the author’s 
discontent with the state not only of method of comparative law but also of 
the debate itself, in which too much emphasis lies in criticism and too little 
in the formulation of new, better methodology. I am intrigued by her inter-
est in building on one tradition in comparative law, namely the functional 
method – without necessarily denying that other methods are possible as 
well.3 Her own proposal, merely summarized in the fourth section of her 
1 Julie de Coninck, The Functional Method of Comparative Law: Quo Vadis?, in this issue 
p.  318–350 (cited as Quo Vadis).
2 Julie de Coninck, Overcoming the Mere Heuristic Aspirations of (Functional) Compara-
tive Legal Research?, An Exploration into the Possibilities and Limits of Behavioral Econom-
ics: Global Jurist Vol.  9 Issue 4 (2009) Article 3, available at <http://www.bepress.com/gj/
vol9/iss4/art 3> (cited as Exploration).
3 Geoffrey Samuel, Dépasser le fonctionnalisme, in: Comparer les droits, résolument, ed. by 
Pierre Legrand (2009) 405–430.
352 ralf michaels RabelsZ
article in this journal, is elaborated at greater length elsewhere, so my com-
ment extends to that other article as well.4
De Coninck criticizes existing functionalist comparative law for what she 
perceives as lack of interest in empirical foundations. Traditional functional-
ists, so she says, simply presume similarity of problems without actually 
proving it. New functionalists (among whom she counts Prof. Jaakko Husa 
and myself ) even abandon, she claims, any claim to empirical foundations. 
Her response is that empirical foundations can be found, in particular in 
behavioral studies, which reveal certain behavioral patterns. For example, 
the endowment effect “seems to provide an interesting empirical starting 
point from which to compare the ways in which different legal systems take 
account of the fact of physical possession.”5 In this sense (I think) behavioral 
constants like the endowment effect are supposed to take the place that 
problems take traditionally in comparative law.
When de Coninck criticizes me for disclaiming any interest in empirical 
reality, this is a misunderstanding. In fact, de Coninck’s attention to em-
pirical inquiry is very welcome in a discipline riddled with shallow stereo-
types of different legal orders. The behavioral studies, currently in vogue in 
legal studies more general, may indeed prove especially fruitful. Particularly, 
her plea that behavioral economics is preferable to classical economics is 
welcome, especially for comparative law.6 The rational agent model of tradi-
tional economics, in its universality, turns cross-country variation into an 
anomaly.7 Behavioral economics, by contrast, should be more fruitful espe-
cially for the fi nding and explanation of differences.
What remains, I think, is a methodological problem. What she needs to 
show, I would argue, is not merely that behavioral studies are superior to 
classic economics, but also that empirical fi ndings like the endowment effect 
provide a fi rmer basis for comparative law. The problem lies not so much in 
the acquisition of empirical data per se, but in the demonstration of the links 
between these data and the law.
II. Explanation
Let me explain the methodological challenges on the basis of her own 
example: De Coninck suggests an “empirically substantiated behavioral pat-
tern as a point of reference” for comparative law, namely the well-known 
4 De Coninck, Exploration (supra n.  2).
5 De Coninck, Exploration (supra n.  2) at 15.
6 See already Ralf Michaels, Im Westen nichts Neues?: RabelsZ 66 (2002) 97–115 (110 
n.  54).
7 See Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?: U. Toronto 
L. J. 59 (2009) 197–213 (199–200).
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endowment effect – the observation that individuals assign higher value to 
an object if they hold it in their possession than if they would need to acquire 
it, and, relatedly, that possession gives them a feeling of ownership.8 These 
fi ndings, she suggests, “lend further support to the proposition that (physi-
cal) possession is a prominent factor for assigning ownership to others that 
are in possession of the object in question.”9
A fi rst problem I see with this concerns the endowment effect itself. The 
effect was long observed among students under quasi-laboratory conditions, 
no doubt in order to fi lter out noise from contextual and cultural “noise”.10 
However, this means that Frankenberg’s criticism of the functional method 
(which de Coninck cites approvingly) seems to apply equally to her own 
approach if we replace “solutions” with “observations”:11 “How solutions 
can be ›cut loose‹ from their context and at the same time be related to their 
environment escapes me.” Her problem is similar: the endowment effect 
simultaneously represents, “quite a robust fi nding” and is “highly context-
dependent”12. Indeed, de Coninck herself reports that a comparable eco-
nomic experiment, the ultimatum game, has been shown to yield remarka-
bly different results when tried in different cultures in the world.13 The en-
dowment effect is, in other words, not universal; it is no less culturally 
contingent than are social problems. This suggests that behavioral observa-
tions (like problems) cannot serve as universal referents.14
The problem is not only variation, however.15 More broadly, the problem 
is that observations cannot be stripped from their relation to society if they 
8 The endowment effect may thus be viewed as experimental evidence for an assessment 
that the law had previously assumed to be true. See, e.g., Marianne Bauer, Zur Publizitätsfunk-
tion des Besitzes bei Übereignung von Fahrnis, in: FS Friedrich Wilhelm Bosch (1976) 1–
25.
9 De Coninck, Quo Vadis (supra n.  1) 348, internal reference omitted. A more detailed 
discussion is in De Coninck, Exploration (supra n.  2) at 7–11.
10 The students in such experiments have been called WEIRD, an acronym for Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic. See Joseph Henrich/Steven J. Heine/Ara Noren-
zayan, The Weirdest People in the World?: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (forthcoming).
11 Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law: Harv. Int. 
L. J. 26 (1985) 411–455 (440), cited in de Coninck, Quo Vadis (supra n.  1) 336.
12 De Coninck, Exploration (supra n.  2) at 11, 18 respectively.
13 Joseph Henrich et al., Cross-cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-
Scale Societies: Behavioral & Brain Sciences 28 (2005) 795–815; cf. de Coninck, Exploration 
(supra n.  2) at 16–18.
14 De Coninck, Exploration (supra n.  2) at 16–18, suggests that a referent like the endow-
ment effect need not be universal to enable meaningful comparison. I think her own example 
demonstrates the opposite: we can compare the different responses to the endowment effect 
experiment only because that experiment itself (and hence the problem posed) is the same 
across different cultures. In other words, although the endowment effect itself may not be 
universal, the experiment that generates it is.
15 Quite to the contrary, an explanatory theory of comparative law would require varia-
tion (and preferably random variation at that) because causation cannot be inferred without it: 
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are supposed to have any implications for society. This is a problem espe-
cially for law. Law is necessarily interpersonal; it takes place in society. 
Whether Robinson Crusoe is the owner of the things on his island matters 
only once Friday appears. Given that ownership describes at least in part an 
interpersonal relationship between the owner and others (it is a “right against 
the world”),16 a “feeling of ownership” cannot properly be measured with-
out account of the others against whom it exists, and this suggests that we 
need to know about who these others are.17
A related second problem, more specifi c to comparative law, follows from 
the fi rst. That problem is endogeneity, a problem that riddles comparative 
social sciences more generally.18 Even if we accept the separation of observa-
tions and society, of facts and law, the direction of the causal arrow between 
them is unclear. De Coninck suggests that the law protects possession be-
cause people value possession highly. This sounds plausible, but the opposite 
may be the case, too: it may be that people value possession highly because 
they have internalized the legal rules that protect it. Or there may be no 
causation between observation and law at all, and instead an independent 
causal factor may be at work – maybe a hardwired structure in the brain that 
makes us prefer both possession and rules that protect it, maybe a general 
quality of societies that makes possession particularly valuable. To take an-
other example: Does the law protect the purchase in good faith as a response 
to people’s general assumption that the seller in possession is the owner? Or 
does the purchaser in good faith assume the seller in possession to be the 
owner as a consequence of the legal rules that grant protection to good faith 
purchase?19 It may be possible to show correlations this way (and this would 
be far from uninteresting) but not necessarily causation, explanation for ex-
isting legal rules.
A third problem, however, might be the most important one. Even if we 
think both that facts and law are separable and that the causal arrow goes 
from facts to law, it is not clear what kind of legal institutions the endow-
ment effect would actually lead to. De Coninck’s suggestion, if I read her 
we cannot infer that A causes X unless we observe also situations without A and without X. 
In this regard, if the endowment effect were indeed universal it would be a particularly inad-
equate tool for explanation.
16 In my view, ownership combines two relations: a relation of assignment between the 
owner and the object, and a relation of directedness with other persons. See Ralf Michaels, 
Sachzuordnung durch Kaufvertrag (2001) 249–257.
17 See also Ino Augsberg, Comment on Geir Stenseth’s Secrets of Property in Law: Ancilla 
Iuris 2008, 114–117 (a response to the article by Stenseth discussed approvingly in de Coninck, 
Quo Vadis [supra n.  1] 349).
18 Adam Przeworski, Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible?, in: The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. by Carles Boix/Susan C. Stoke (paperback ed. 2009) 
147–171.
19 Michaels (supra n.  16) 295–301.
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correctly, is that the endowment effect is an explanation for stronger protec-
tion of possession by the law.20 This rests on what is sometimes called the 
mirror thesis of law: law refl ects preferences in society (and, one might add, 
psychological facts found in the individual). But the opposite seems prima 
facie equally plausible: if the affection that individuals have for things in 
their possession prevents desirable transactions from taking place, we might 
expect the law to counter this by awarding especially weak protection to 
possession. For example, if “one may feel some sense of ownership of items 
one dose not own (e.g. a borrowed bicycle) and behave as an owner might 
(e.g., resenting the owners’ demand for its return)”,21 the law does not re-
ward this feeling of ownership: the owner can still claim the bicycle back. 
Sometimes law mirrors individual preferences; sometimes law constrains in-
dividual desires.
III. Functions
The last point can be restated: If we think that the endowment effect 
somehow leads to strong protection of possession rather than to legal institu-
tions aiming at weakening possession, we do so because we make an as-
sumption about the social relevance of the endowment effect: We think that 
the societal need created by the endowment effect is the protection of indi-
vidual possession, not the restriction of possession. Only if we (or the law) 
draw this conclusion does it make sense for the law to respond with institu-
tions that protect possession, rather than with rules that give incentives to do 
away with one’s possession This translation helps situate de Coninck’s pro-
posal within functionalist methods: legal rules are explained with their 
function in this case to protect individual feelings of ownership.
At the same time, the translation opens up ground for a criticism that de 
Coninck herself formulates: “whatever turns a factual situation into a prob-
lem already contains a – fundamentally contingent – value-judgment.”22 
The endowment effect may be an observable effect. Its implications for the 
law, however, depend on the interpretation of this fact, and interpretations 
can differ, and none can be demonstrated to be the correct one.
This is fatal only if we subscribe to a widely-held assumption in the social 
sciences, namely that only empirical generalizable knowledge is valid, and 
that the aim of comparative law must be to demonstrate generalities. A sim-
ilar tendency to abstraction may be suffi cient for other disciplines for which 
20 De Coninck, Quo Vadis (supra n.  1) 348 with references in n.  141.
21  Jochen Reb/Terry Connolly, Possession, Feelings of Ownership and the Endowment Ef-
fect: Judgment & Decision Making 2 (2007) 107 (108), cited in de Coninck, Exploration (supra 
n.  2) at 19.
22 De Coninck, Quo Vadis (supra n.  1) 327.
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law is a mere object of analysis: Political scientists were satisfi ed with fi nding 
three different models of judicial review; economists were satisfi ed with two 
models of legal families – civil law and common law – as causes for eco-
nomic progress. The promise of such abstraction is that it enables generality 
and large sample groups, a requirement for signifi cant statistical fi ndings.23 
Insofar, of course, “it is perfectly possible to make non-normative statements 
about normative issues.”24.
The problem is, however, that specifi c knowledge, close attention to the 
peculiarities of a legal system and the context, both legal and extralegal, 
within which legal institutions exist – in short, the “thick description” that 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz has famously asked for – are made impossi-
ble.25 This kind of description that is not possible through abstraction and 
generalization, is often what we most need in comparative law. This prob-
lem affects also fi ndings in the behavioral sciences like the endowment ef-
fect, as exciting as they may be in other regards: The knowledge we gain 
from these fi ndings – humans value possession, they are somewhat altruistic, 
etc. – tends to be very general; it is therefore of only limited assistance in the 
discussion of specifi c legal rules and institutions, at least without extensive 
speculation. Comparative lawyers should welcome this assistance, but they 
need to be aware of its limitations.
IV. Interpretation
If social scientifi c explanatory comparative law has these limits, how can 
we still compare? If problems and functional relations are not observable 
empirical realities, at least not in the neutral, observer-independent way that 
the social sciences typically require, do they lose all value? This is where the 
suggestion comes in to use problems and functions as heuristic tools in an 
interpretative approach to comparative law. The proposal to reconceive of 
functions as tools rather than realities does not disclaim empirical reality for 
comparative law, even less does it “expressly renounce any empirical claims” 
for the fi eld, as de Coninck criticises. If anything, the approach does the op-
posite: it attempts to take empirical realities seriously and render them com-
23 See Holger Spamann, Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative 
Law?: Am. J. Comp. L. 59 (2009) 797–810. See also, for a plea to use more empirical testing 
of hypotheses, Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality Seriously in Comparative Constiti-
tional Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Economy: Loyola 
L. A. L. Rev. 41 (2008) 629–682.
24 De Coninck, Quo Vadis (supra n.  1) 342.
25 See Michaels (supra n.  7) at 210–211, and the response by Gillian Hadfi eld, The Strategy 
of Methodology: The Virtues of Being Reductionist for Comparative Law: U. Toronto L. J. 
59 (2009) 223–235.
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parable without the reductionism that comes with statistical analysis, with 
simple causal relations. To some extent this should not be a very revolution-
ary suggestion: Even the most empirics-focused social scientists agree that 
equivalence as a basis for comparability “is a matter of inference, not of direct 
observations”, in other words, a matter of interpretation.26 “[T]o identify 
causal effects, we must rely on some assumptions that are untestable.”27
If we want to truly understand different laws we need a non-reductionist 
way to interpret our knowledge of legal rules and institutions, and functions 
can serve as an interpretive cross-systemic perspective. The only area where 
we should reduce our empirical aspirations is in the search for objectively 
existing problems and functions, simply because these are (as de Coninck 
agrees) constructs. However, this frees us to deal with the empirical facts 
that actually matter. Once we direct our attention to the way in which legal 
systems themselves create their own functional relations, once we compare 
the different (but functionally equivalent) responses in different legal sys-
tems to what we can see as similar problems, we understand better each of 
these legal systems in its specifi c characteristics. Such an interpretive ap-
proach may indeed not lead to the kind of cumulative knowledge that de 
Coninck asks for, but instead create the kind of development that Clifford 
Geertz claims for anthropology: “Studies do build on other studies, not in 
the sense that they take up where the others leave off, but in the sense that, 
better informed and better conceptualized, they plunge more deeply into 
the same thing.”28
This is not (yet) a fully developed theory, as de Coninck rightly points 
out,29 and in this context I can do no more than sketch some elements. My 
own approach rests on the non-reductionist functionalism developed by 
Cassirer and Luhmann. Especially Luhmann’s system-theoretical approach 
to law has, I believe, potential for comparative law, too but an explicit elab-
oration does not exist. One of Luhmann’s insights is that problems and func-
tional relations are constructions by the legal system itself; we may say they 
are the way in which the legal system makes sense of itself. This suggests 
why a specifi c juristic and normative approach – in other words, the internal 
method of law itself – may be more appropriate to this endeavor than an 
external observation of law. At the same time, it suggests why testable pre-
dictions are hard to attain: the choice of one amongst various functionally 
equivalent legal institutions is a choice made by the legal system that cannot 
26 Adam Przeworski/Henry Theune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (1970) 117; 
see also, on the relation between interpretation and inference, Gary King/Robert O. Keohane/
Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (1994) 36–42.
27 Przeworski/Theune (previous note) at 169.
28 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) 25.
29 De Coninck, Quo Vadis (supra n.  1) 343.
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be predicted merely from the nature of the problem itself.30 Evolution can 
perhaps be proven to take place, but the specifi c direction of evolution can-
not be predicted. We can understand the legal system from its past, but we 
cannot predict the specifi cs of its future.
V. Conclusion
Inasmuch as we can gain relevant empirical observations, in particular in 
behavioral sciences, comparative lawyers should draw on them. In one re-
spect de Coninck is even too cautious when she bemoans that behavioral 
economics has not found a theory as to why and when certain behavior oc-
curs:31 This is a problem for economics, but not necessarily for comparative 
law. At least insofar as comparative law tries to explain legal institutions as 
responses to empirically observable behavior, it needs no deep theory as to 
why this behavior occurs. For us, the endowment effect is the explanans, not 
the explanandum.
The question is just how far these observations of behavioral regularities 
will carry us, and here I remain somewhat skeptical. Certain hardwired 
structures in the brain, certain feats displayed by any given society, may be 
responsible for what H. L. A. Hart called “the minimum content of natural 
law” and which may be described as the necessary content any law must 
have because it is made for actual human beings.32 Insofar, biological evolu-
tion may have explanatory value (though, given the great cross-ethnic sim-
ilarity of our genetic code, it will rarely explain cross-cultural variation). 
Beyond this, the explanatory value of biological evolution currently in 
vogue seems to me exaggerated: Much can happen on the long way of causa-
tion from the last genetic mutation in humanity to contemporary corporate 
governance regimes. Most of the evolution that is relevant for the develop-
ment of the law is social evolution, and although new developments in evo-
lutionary theory can be very useful here, the messy terrain of social facts is 
familiar terrain for comparative law in general and functionalist comparative 
law in particular.
All of this implies that the empirical foundations de Coninck suggests 
have indubitable potential for comparative law. Regardless of whether the 
law replicates or counters the endowment effect, the effect itself is a relevant 
empirical factor in the explanation of the rule. The fact that any rule on pos-
30 Although evolution is downplayed in many articles on the functional method, the 
method, properly understood, is necessarily an evolutionary one, though not with a predeter-
mined direction. See Niklas Luhmann. Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie, in id., Sozi-
ologische Aufklärung 1: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme8 (2009) 39–67.
31 De Coninck, Exploration (supra n.  2) at 24.
32 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) 189–195.
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session is compatible with the endowment effect does not strip the effect of 
its relevance for every one of these rules. However, the (causal or functional) 
relation between facts and legal rules will only rarely be observable as an 
empirical fact itself, or even allow inference without the aid of untestable 
assumptions. More frequently, inference will not be suffi cient, and we will 
be left with interpretation. I do not think this needs to be viewed as a fail-
ure.
